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Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,090 (D. Minn. 1990) (conveyance
of farm to bank).
8 I.R.C. § 1231.  See, e.g., Good v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 906
(1952), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2 (unimproved land rented for
pasture used in trade or business because of consistent
attempts by taxpayer to rent land).
9 I.R.C. § 1221.
10 Ltr. Rul. 8350008, Aug. 23, 1983 (mere rental of real
property does not constitute trade or business under
I.R.C. § 1231).
11 See, e.g., Wofac Corp. v. United States, 269 F. Supp.
654 (D. N.J. 1976) (business discontinued because of
unprofitability; non capital asset status not lost
immediately).
12 See Bressi v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-651 (capital
gains income as to excess of fair market value over
basis; discharge of indebtedness income for indebtedness
discharged over fair market value).
13 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).
14 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B).
15 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A).
16 I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
17 I.R.C. § 108(g).  See Harl, Neil E., "Meeting the Tests
for the Solvent Farm Debtor Rule," 5 Agric. L. Dig. 153
(1994).
18 I.R.C. § 108(c).
19 See Tufts v. Comm'r, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Estate of
Newman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-230; Rev. Rul.
82-202, 1982-2 C.B. 36; Ltr. Rul. 9302001, Aug. 31,
1992 (difference between property basis and debt is
gain; no discharge of indebtedness income).  Compare
Fulton Gold Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934)
(reduction in non recourse debt results only in basis
reduction, not in immediate taxation).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
POSSESSION. The disputed property was included in
the titles of both parties. The disputed property was a
wooded marsh area at the rear of the defendants' residences
and the defendants used the disputed area occasionally for
hunting and trapping. The plaintiff had the property
surveyed in 1960 and had placed stone markers on the
corners and wood stakes along the disputed line. The
plaintiff had granted hunting and trapping leases and
continually inspected the property and the boundary
markers. The plaintiff also dug trenasses (shallow ditches)
in the disputed property and maintained the trenasses. The
court held that the defendant failed to prove continuous
possession of the disputed property during the previous ten
years sufficient to claim the disputed property by acquisitive
prescription (adverse possession). Harry Bourg Corp. v.
Punch, 653 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was a wheat farmer who had
borrowed operating funds from the FmHA over several
years. The debtor had granted the FmHA a security interest
in all crops grown on the debtor's farm and the FmHA had
perfected the security interest. The debtor sought a bank
loan for planting costs for the 1992 wheat crop but the bank
required a subordination of the FmHA security interest in
the crop which the FmHA refused to grant. The debtor then
borrowed the funds from the debtor's father. In order to pay
off that loan and to cover the harvesting costs, the debtor
leased the land to the father who hired the debtor to harvest
the crop. The debtor assigned to the father a contract to
purchase the crop from a third party. Neither the debtor nor
the father paid any of the proceeds of the crop to the FmHA.
The FmHA sought to have its claim considered
nondischargeable to the extent the proceeds of the 1992 crop
were not paid to the FmHA. The court held that the
assignment and sale of the contract to third parties without
payment to the FmHA when the debtor knew that the
FmHA had the priority security interest in the crop was a a
willful conversion of the crop with the intent to harm the
FmHA; therefore, the FmHA debt was nondischargeable to
the extent of the sale proceeds of the crop. In re Recker,
180 B.R. 540 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. Before filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
transferred title to the debtor's residence to a trust for the
benefit of an heir. At the time of the petition, the debtor
continued to reside in the house and paid all maintenance
expenses, taxes and insurance on the property and continued
to pay the mortgage on the property. The debtor claimed the
house as an exempt homestead. The court held that the
transfer of title to the trust removed the homestead nature of
the property and denied the exemption. In re Robinson, 180
B.R. 174 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
IRA. The debtor claimed stock held in an IRA as exempt
under Wash. Rev. Code. § 6.15.020. The trustee objected to
the exemption, arguing that the state law was preempted by
ERISA. The court held that ERISA did not preempt the state
law exemption for IRAs. In re Nelson, 180 B.R. 584
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL . When the mortgagee attempted to
foreclose on the debtor's farm land in 1987, the debtor filed
for Chapter 12, but the case was dismissed when the debtor
defaulted on plan payments of administrative costs and
property taxes. The creditor again attempted foreclosure but
the debtor refiled for Chapter 12 just before the foreclosure
sale. The second case was also dismissed because the court
found that the debtor could not successfully reorganize and
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the court held that the debtor would not be allowed to
modify the plan. When the creditor again tried to foreclose,
the debtor filed a third Chapter 12 case. By the time of the
third filing, the mortgage debt had more than doubled,
although the mortgagee was still oversecured, and the
property taxes had more than tripled. The creditor sought
relief from the automatic stay and dismissal of the case. The
debtor argued that an offer of adequate protection payments
was sufficient to bar relief from the automatic stay. The
court held that the case should be dismissed because (1) the
excessive delay was caused by the debtor's multiple last
minute filings, (2) a great increase in the mortgage debt and
property taxes was incurred during the delay, (3) the second
case dismissal order barred any further amended plans, and
(4) the debtor still had no chance of a successful
reorganization. Matter of Fern Acres, Ltd., 180 B.R. 554
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
PLAN . The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan provided for
payment of the Farm Credit Bank’s (FCB) secured loan over
30 years at 8 percent interest. The FCB objected to the plan
as not paying it the current value of the claim because the
interest rate was less than the market rate for similar loans.
The FCB argued that the interest rate should be 11.1
percent, equal to the interest rate for new loans, 9.85
percent, plus 1.2 percent for the increased risk of lending to
the debtor with a history of defaults and a financially
troubled farming operation. The court held that the debtors
did not pose any additional risk because the bankruptcy case
would provide a comprehensive reorganization of the
debtors’ finances; therefore, the appropriate interest rate
would be the market rate for similar new loans, 9.85
percent, with no additional interest for risk. The court also
denied confirmation of the debtors’ plan because the
projected income and expenses were substantially different
than the debtors’ historical income and expenses and the
debtors failed to explain the differences. The court
dismissed the case because the debtors had failed to propose
a confirmable plan, had failed to file proper schedules on
time and had failed to timely prosecute the case throughout
the proceedings. The debtors' appeal was dismissed as
untimely filed. In re Zerr, 180 B.R. 281 (D. Kan. 1995),
app. dismissed, 167 B.R. 953 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. The debtor had borrowed
from the Small Business Administration (SBA) which had a
first lien on the debtor's property. The IRS levied against the
debtor's assets for back taxes and sold the property at
auction. The IRS applied the proceeds to the debtor's tax
liability but later paid the proceeds to the SBA after the
SBA requested the proceeds based on its prior lien. The
debtor sought to avoid, under Section 547, the payment to
the SBA as a preferential transfer. The court held that only a
trustee has the power to avoid preferential transfers. The
court also held that the SBA payment was proper and
complied with federal tax law and secured transactions law.
In re Danley, 180 B.R. 291 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1995).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed a claim in the debtor's Chapter
13 case but did not file the claim using the official
Bankruptcy Court form. When the debtor objected to the
claim, the IRS filed an amended claim for the same amount
but on the official form. The debtor objected to the claim
because the amendment was untimely, the IRS failed to
include evidence to support the claim and the IRS refused to
file income tax returns for the debtor for the tax years
involved with the claim. The court held that the amendment
was allowed because the initial claim substantially complied
with filing requirements and was sufficient notice to the
debtor of the IRS claim. The court also held that the IRS
was not required to file substitute returns for the debtor nor
provide any evidence to support its claim until the debtor
provided some evidence that the claim was erroneous.
Martin v. I.R.S., 180 B.R. 90 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
The debtors filed for Chapter 12 in November 1992 and
listed the IRS as a creditor. The IRS bankruptcy claims
office for the debtor's state reviewed the debtor's file and
found only a de minimis amount of taxes due and did not
file a claim in the case, although the IRS requested the
debtor to file any future income tax returns with the
bankruptcy claims office and not the regional service center.
The debtor filed the tax return for 1991 late and postpetition
but filed the return with the regional service center. The
debtor's plan provided for a federal tax claim equal to the
amount of taxes due for the 1991 return. The IRS did not
file a claim until after the claims bar date and sought
permission to file the untimely claim based on an
amendment of the claim listed by the debtor in the plan or
based on the equities of the case. The court held that the IRS
claim could not be treated as an amendment of the debtor's
listing of the IRS claim because the IRS had not actively
participated in the case until it filed its claim. However, the
court held that because the debtor filed the 1991 return late,
postpetition and to the regional service center, the equities
favored allowing the full IRS claim because the IRS delay
was caused by the debtor. In re Faust, 180 B.R. 432
(Bankr. D. S.C. 1995).
PRIORITY TAX CLAIMS. The debtor received a pre-
petition reversion of amounts in a retired employee pension
plan and the IRS assessed the excise tax under I.R.C. §
4980(a). The IRS filed a claim for the taxes as a priority tax
claim and the other creditors objected, arguing that the tax
was actually a penalty not entitled to the priority of 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(7). The Bankruptcy Court held that the
excise tax was a penalty because it was assessed without
reference to the tax benefits received by the debtor from the
pension plan; therefore, the tax claim was not entitled to a
priority. The Bankruptcy Court also agreed to subordinate
the tax claim to other unsecured claims to avoid the inequity
of the burden on the unsecured creditors. The District Court
reversed, holding that the tax on pension plan reversions
was an excise tax and not a penalty; therefore, the claim was
entitled to priority. In re Juvenile Shoe Corp. of America,
180 B.R. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1995), rev'g and rem'g, 166 B.R.
404 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
TAX LIENS. The IRS had filed claims for pre-petition
taxes owed by the debtor and the claims were determined to
be secured claims, unsecured priority claims, and general
unsecured claims. The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan was
confirmed and after the debtor paid the amount of the
secured claim, the debtor sought release of the tax lien. The
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IRS argued that the lien had to remain effective until all its
claims were paid in order to protect its priority status. The
court held that, under Section 506(d), the tax lien became
void after payment of the underlying obligation. In re
Campbell, 180 B.R. 686 (M.D. Fla. 1995), aff'g, 160 B.R.
198 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
The IRS had filed a tax lien against property owned by a
corporation. The corporation filed for bankruptcy and the
plan provided for the sale of the property to the debtor in the
instant case. The IRS had notice of the plan and sale but did
not object. The IRS did not refile the lien as to the purchaser
and when the purchaser also filed for bankruptcy, the IRS
failed to file a timely claim for the lien. The lower courts
held that because the property subject to the lien was sold,
the tax lien became unperfected and was subject to
avoidance in the purchaser’s bankruptcy case. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the IRS was not required to
refile its tax lien against the transferee in order to maintain
the lien's perfected status against the property. U.S. v. LMS
Holding Co., 50 F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'g, 161
B.R. 1020 (N.D. Okla. 1993), aff’g, 149 B.R. 681 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1993).
TRUSTEE LIABILITY. During a Chapter 7 case for a
corporation, an administrative claim filed by one of the
officers of the corporation was approved subject to further
order of the court. The IRS then levied against the trustee
for taxes owed by the corporation officer but the trustee did
not make any payments under the levy. The corporation was
liquidated and the trustee filed a final distribution plan with
the Bankruptcy Court which approved the plan. The IRS did
not object to the distribution plan although the plan did not
include any payment under the levy. The IRS then assessed
the trustee personally, under I.R.C. § 6331, for failing to
make any payments under the levy. The court held that the
trustee was personally liable for failing to comply with the
levy, at least when the distributions were made, because the
amount due for the officer's claim was fixed and
determinable when the levy was made. United States v.
Hemmen, 51 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
CONTRACTS
"AS IS" SALES. The plaintiff purchased a used farm
tractor from the defendant, an implement dealer. The sales
contract included a statement that the tractor was sold "as
is;" however, the dealer included a statement that the
equipment had not been altered or modified and that the
tractor was serviced according to the manufacturer's
recommendations. The plaintiff was injured when the tractor
lurched when the plaintiff started it in gear, because the
tractor had been modified to bypass the neutral safety
switch. The plaintiff argued that the dealer's statements in
the sales contract was a voluntary inspection and that the
inspection created a duty to discover the modification of the
neutral safety switch. The defendant argued that the sales
contract term "as is" relieved the defendant of any duty to
inspect the tractor. The court held that the sales contract
statements indicated that the dealer had inspected the tractor
in order to make the statements; therefore, the defendant
voluntarily accepted the duty to inspect carefully to the
extent of the sale contract statements. Snelten v. Schmidt
Implement Co., 647 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995).
DAMAGES. The plaintiff and defendant had orally
agreed to farm on a partnership basis. In violation of that
agreement, the defendant sold most of the acres the
defendant had contributed to the partnership and the
plaintiff sued for loss of federal farm program payments and
loss of partnership income. The trial court had calculated
damages based on a bushel per acre production times the
number of acres removed, divided by the plaintiff's share.
The defendant complained that the trial court used gross
profit figures only and should have reduced the damages by
the plaintiff's share of expenses which would have been
incurred to produce the crop. The appellate court reversed
and remanded the case for recalculation of the damages
based on net profit from the removed acres.  Olsen v.
Airheart, 531 N.W.2d 571 (S.D. 1995).
REVOCATION. The defendants advertised in a trade
publication for the sale of a "proven breeder pair" of emus.
The plaintiffs answered the ad and traveled to the
defendants' farm to purchase the emus. The defendants
selected the pair of emus and stated that the emus were a
proven breeder pair. Four months later, the plaintiffs
discovered that both emus displayed male behavior and
notified the defendants who suggested that the plaintiffs
"vent sex" both birds. The "vent sex" examination showed
that both birds were males and the plaintiff sued for loss of
production. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs should
have "sexed" the birds earlier; therefore revocation of the
contract was untimely. The court held that where a seller
expressly warrants the condition of the contract goods, the
buyer is not required to inspect the goods for conformity
with the contract. The court also held that the express
warranty of condition excused the delay in inspection of the
birds until the plaintiffs were on notice that the birds did not
conform to the warranted condition. Smith v. Penbridge
Associates, Inc., 655 A.2d 1015 (Pa. Super. 1995).
TERMINATION. The plaintiff contracted with the
defendant for the defendant to raise cattle owned by the
plaintiff. The contract provided that the contract would run
for three years or terminate by mutual agreement after six
months' notice. The defendant gave the six month notice but
the plaintiff claimed not to have assented to the termination.
The trial court ruled that the six month notice was sufficient
to terminate the contract. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the contact was clear that mutual consent to the
termination was required. Olsen v. Airheart, 531 N.W.2d
571 (S.D. 1995).
CORPORATIONS
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL. The plaintiff
leased cows to the defendants who were the sole
shareholders in a corporation which operated a dairy farm.
The plaintiff sued for conversion, constructive fraud and
bailment when the plaintiff learned that most of the cows
were gone and the remainder were underfed and had to be
sold for slaughter. The plaintiff did not name the
corporation as a defendant and argued that the corporation
should be ignored such that the shareholders were
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personally liable. The court refused to pierce the corporate
veil to find the shareholders personally liable because the
corporation was adequately capitalized and was not
insolvent, the shareholders did not divert corporation assets
to their own use, and the corporate form was not used to
commit fraud, violate a legal duty or perpetuate a dishonest
act. Although the corporation may have breached the lease
contract, the shareholders, through the corporation, did not
breach any duty to the plaintiff outside of the contract. Wolf
v. Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890 (Neb. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The
plaintiff was a cotton producer who obtained federal crop
insurance from the defendants, an insurance company and
an insurance agent. The plaintiff's action alleged negligence,
breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay benefits for
the plaintiff's claim of loss of cotton production from a
drought. The defendants removed the plaintiff's action from
state court to federal district court and the court sua sponte
raised the issue of jurisdiction. The court held that the
Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1506(d), required
federal court jurisdiction only where the FCIC is sued;
therefore, because the FCIC is not involved in the case and
the plaintiff's action is against the defendants for their
actions only, the court held that it did not have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case and remanded the case to the
original state court. O'Neal v. Cigna Property & Cas. Ins.
Co., 878 F. Supp. 845 (D. S.C. 1995).
The FCIC has issued interim regulations amending the
Florida Citrus Endorsement to the General Crop Insurance
Policy to require that the insured crop suffer at least an
average 50 percent of damage before an indemnity would be
due under any catastrophic risk protection policy. 60 Fed.
Reg. 29749 (June 6, 1995).
The FCIC has issued interim regulations  amending the
Hybrid Sorghum Seed, Sunflower Seed and Rice
endorsements of the General Crop Insurance Policy to allow
an insured to collect  a guaranteed deficiency payment under
the 50/92 and 0/92 provisions and a prevented planting
indemnity under the crop insurance program. 60 Fed. Reg.
29959 (June 7, 1995).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT-ALM § 9.05.*
The Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration has issued proposed regulations requiring
scales used for purchasing livestock on a dressed weight
basis or a carcass weight basis be equipped with printing
devices for printing scale tickets. The proposed regulations
also include a requirement that the purchases, sales,
acquisitions and settlements of live poultry be based on
actual weights. 60 Fed. Reg. 29506 (June 5, 1995).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiffs were cotton
farmers who applied an insecticide to their cotton crop in
combination with a herbicide. The plaintiffs sued the
manufacturer of the insecticide for negligence and strict
liability. Four of the claims against the defendant involved
the failure to warn about the dangers to crops from applying
the insecticide with the herbicide. The court ruled that these
claims were pre-empted by FIFRA. The plaintiffs also
alleged that (1) the defendant negligently designed the
insecticide so that if used with another product it would
cause damage to cotton crops and (2) the defendant failed to
adequately test the insecticide with other products to
discover the danger of combined application. The court held
that these two claims were essentially claims of failure to
warn and were also pre-empted by FIFRA. Hopkins v.
American Cyanamid Co., 658 So.2d 196 (La. Ct. App.
1995).
The plaintiffs grew strawberry, blackberry and other
plants for sale. The plants were treated with a fungicide
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that
the fungicide was contaminated with a herbicide which
caused the loss of several years' production of plants and
made some of their soil unusable. The defendant argued that
the claim was unprovable because the plaintiffs had applied
for federal disaster payments for destruction of the plants
from wet weather. The plaintiffs responded that the disaster
payments were applied for before they realized the true
cause of the problem. The court held that sufficient evidence
was available for a jury to determine whether the fungicide
caused the loss of the plants. The defendant also argued that
the plaintiffs' claims were pre-empted by FIFRA. The court
held that the claims of misrepresentation and breach of
implied warranty were pre-empted as based on failure to
warn and inadequate labeling. However, the court held that
the plaintiffs' claims of failure to recall the contaminated
product and to warn the purchasers of the contamination
after the defendant knew about the contamination were not
pre-empted by FIFRA because the claims went beyond
inadequate labeling. Miller v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 880 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Miss.1994).
WOOL . The CCC has adopted as final regulations
establishing the 1995 support level for mohair at $4.657 per
pound. 60 Fed. Reg. 28522 (June 1, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayer executed
a will which provided for a bequest which created a trust for
several charities. The trust provided for distribution of all
annual net income and authorized the trustee to substitute a
new charitable beneficiary if any charitable beneficiary
terminated or otherwise became ineligible for charitable
organization status. The trustee also had the power to
terminate the trust if the trust became infeasible to operate
and to divide the remaining trust corpus among the existing
beneficiaries in the same proportion as income was
distributed. The IRS ruled that if no changes of law or fact
occur, the trust bequest would be eligible for the charitable
deduction for estate tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9521011, Feb.
23, 1995.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent and
surviving spouse had created a revocable inter vivos trust
with the grantors and their daughter as cotrustees. When the
decedent died, the trust provided for a splitting of the trust
into two trusts with one trust for the surviving spouse
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consisting of enough estate property to reduce the decedent's
estate tax to zero. The surviving spouse remained as
cotrustee and income beneficiary. Within nine months after
the decedent's death, the surviving spouse disclaimed any
rights to the income or corpus of the trust and disclaimed
any power to act as trustee. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimer was effective. The IRS noted that the disclaimer
of a trustee was not usually allowed but because the
surviving spouse also disclaimed interests in the income and
corpus of the trust, the disclaimer of the trustee powers was
allowed. Ltr. Rul. 9521032, Feb. 28, 1995.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* Eleven irrevocable trusts were created for the
grantor's family members from 1959 through 1974. Pursuant
to express authority in the trusts' agreements, the trustees
terminated the original trusts and formed new trusts
identical to the original trusts but added a spendthrift
provision to each trust. The IRS ruled that only because the
spendthrift provisions were authorized by the original trusts,
the new trusts would not be subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9521008, Feb. 22, 1995.
Two i rrevocable trusts for the grantor's three daughters
were created in 1959. The two trusts were identical except
that the trusts had slightly different standards for trustee
invasion of principal for the benefit of a beneficiary. The
current beneficiaries were one surviving daughter and the
issue of one other daughter. In 1992, the trusts were merged
into one trust with each beneficiary retaining the same share
of trust income. The trust was then split back into two trusts,
again retaining the beneficiaries' proportionate share of trust
assets and income. The standards of corpus distribution also
were retained as to the same assets through the merger and
split of the trusts. The IRS ruled that the trusts were not
made subject to GSTT by the merger and split. Ltr. Rul.
9521021, Feb. 27, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent's will bequeathed the residual estate to the
surviving spouse if the surviving spouse "survived
distribution of her share of the remainder of my estate." The
will also provided for passing of the residual share to the
decedent's heirs if the spouse did not survive the decedent.
The estate claimed a marital deduction for personal and real
property in the residual estate which was distributed to the
surviving spouse. The IRS denied the marital deduction
because the will did not provide for absolute passing of the
property to the surviving spouse within six months of the
decedent's death. The estate argued that the will was
ambiguous and sought to include extrinsic evidence of the
decedent's intent that the surviving spouse only needed to
have survived the decedent to take under the residuary
clause. The court held that, as to the personal property, the
surviving spouse would not receive title until the property
was distributed; therefore, no marital deduction was allowed
because the will provision would divest the surviving
spouse of that property if the spouse died before
distribution. However, because, under Washington law, title
to real property passed to heirs immediately upon the death
of the decedent, the marital deduction was allowed for the
real property because distribution was deemed to have
occurred immediately. The IRS made the argument that the
marital deduction was not to be allowed because it was
subject to reduction for estate expenses, an argument
quickly rejected by the court as undermining all marital
deductions. Estate of Bond v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. No. 31
(1995).
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH. The decedent had established a revocable trust
which provided that the decedent reserved the right to
amend the trust by written notice to the trustee. In 1980, the
decedent sent the trustee a written amendment to the trust to
provide for annual distributions of corpus to several persons,
with the distributions to commence in the next year. The
distributions were not made in 1983, 1986 and 1987. The
decedent died in 1987 and the trustees made the missing
distributions after the decedent's death. The decedent's estate
claimed a deduction for the post-death payments but the
deductions were denied. The court held that the payments
were not deductible as claims against the estate because the
payments were an obligation of the trust and not the estate.
The court also held that the 1986 and 1987 payments were
included in the decedent's estate because the payments
represented a relinquishment of the decedent's right to
revoke the trust as to those payments within three years of
the decedent's death. The 1983 payment was not included
because the relinquishment of the power to revoke occurred
more than three years before the decedent's death. White v.
U.S., 881 F. Supp. 688 (D. Mass. 1995).
VALUATION. The decedent's estate included several
mineral leaseholds and the issue was the value of the
minerals extracted between the date of the decedent's death
and the alternate valuation date. The court held that the
extracted minerals had to be valued as if the minerals were
still in place and the value could not include any factor
based on the actual sales price of the extracted minerals.
Holl v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,197
(10th Cir. 1995), rev'g and rem'g, 101 T.C. 455 (1993), on
rem. from 967 F.2d 1437 (10th Cir. 1992).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][b].*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned a
corporation which operated a bus company. The taxpayer
diverted payments to the corporation for the taxpayer's own
use and issued corporation checks in payment for personal
expenses. The taxpayer also loaned money to the
corporation but at below-market interest rates. The court
held that the diverted money and checks were constructive
income to the taxpayer and that the value of the difference
between the market rate of interest and the interest actually
charged was income to the taxpayer. Pittman v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-243.
SHAREHOLDER'S BASIS. The taxpayer was a
corporation which owned all the shares of a subsidiary
corporation. The taxpayer entered into a short sale of stock
of unrelated corporations and transferred the proceeds of
that sale to the subsidiary which assumed the obligation to
deliver identical stock to close the sale. At the time of the
assumption, the cost of the replacement stock was less than
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the short sale amount. The IRS ruled that upon contribution
of the proceeds to the subsidiary, the taxpayer's basis in the
subsidiary's stock increased but that the increase was offset
by the assumed obligation to replace the stock. Rev. Rul.
95-45, I.R.B. 1995-26.
WITHHOLDING. The taxpayer entered into an oral
agreement with a neighboring farmer to operate that
farmer's farm for $350 per week. The taxpayer did not fill
out any W-4 forms and accepted the weekly checks without
objection. The taxpayer operated the farm and grew and
harvested various crops. The taxpayer also leased another
farm and produced crops with the financial help of the
farmer. The farmer filed Form 1099 and claimed the wages
paid and the financial assistance as non-employee
compensation. The taxpayer filed tax returns which included
the $350 weekly payments as wages but the taxpayer
included a statement that claimed that the actual weekly
wage was $500 with the difference being withheld federal
and state taxes. The IRS conceded that the $350 weekly
wages were the taxpayer's income but denied that the
taxpayer should be credited for the withheld amounts
claimed by the taxpayer. The court held that (1) the $350
wages paid by the farmer were exempt from withholding
because the taxpayer performed agricultural labor and (2)
because the taxpayer did not file any W-4 forms with the
farmer or otherwise request withholding, the taxpayer could
not claim any credit for withheld employment taxes which
were not actually withheld or paid. Spell v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-229.
PROPERTY
COTENANCY. The debtor purchased a rice farm with
several others in order to have a place to hunt ducks. The
debtor operated the farm in order to defray the expenses of
ownership by all parties. Eventually, the debtor acquired 7/8
ownership of the property with a widow of one of the
purchasers retaining a 1/8 interest. The property was no
longer used by the widow as a hunting area and the debtor
had exclusive use of the property to grow rice, either by the
debtor or through a cropshare agreement with a tenant. The
property was sold as part of a bankruptcy case and the issue
was the amount of the proceeds which belonged to the
cotenants. The debtor argued that the cotenant out of
possession (COTOP) owed for the expenses of the property
and the COTOP sought a portion of the income from the
property. The court held that the COTOP was not entitled to
a share of the income from the sharecrop lease because the
debtor paid a portion of the expenses in return for a share of
the crop. The court also held that the COTOP was liable
only for loan expenses based on the loan taken when the co-
owners were using the land for hunting and the additional
loans incurred by the debtor for operating the rice farm were
the liability of the debtor alone.  The court also held that the
COTOP's share of expenses could be offset by the value of
the debtor's exclusive use of the property. In re Fazzio, 180
B.R. 263 (Bankr. E.D. Calif. 1995).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CORN PICKER-ALM § 1.02[4].* The plaintiff was
injured while operating a corn picker manufactured by the
defendant and the plaintiff sued for defective design, failure
to warn, negligence and breach of implied and express
warranty. In pre-trial motions, the defendant argued that the
suit should be dismissed because the danger was open and
obvious, either because of the plaintiff's use of the machine
or the warnings on the machine. The court denied the
motion and held that, because the plaintiff had only eight
hours of use of the machine before the accident, the
plaintiff's use of the machine was not sufficient to give the
plaintiff knowledge of the danger as a matter of law. In
addition, the court held that an issue of fact remained as to
whether the warnings were sufficient. Bellinger v. Deere &
Co., 881 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. N.Y. 1995).
GROWTH HORMONES-ALM § 1.02[4].* The
plaintiff operated a cattle feeding operation where the
plaintiff fed cattle on contract with the cattle owners. One
owner requested that its cattle be implanted with growth
hormones manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff
contracted with veterinarians who supplied and implanted
the growth hormones in the cattle. The cattle did not gain
weight as expected and the plaintiff alleged that losses were
sustained because the cattle had to be fed longer to reach
market weight. The plaintiff sued the defendant under
theories of strict liability, negligence and breach of express
and implied warranties. The court held that summary
judgment for the the defendant was properly granted
because (1) the plaintiff sought only consequential
economic damages, (2) the plaintiff did not purchase the
hormones from the defendant, and (3) the plaintiff did not
own the cattle. Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528
N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1995).
SEEDS-ALM § 1.02[4].* The plaintiffs purchased milo
seed produced by a subsidiary of the defendant. While
planting the seed, the plaintiffs noticed that some of the seed
was much smaller but did not adjust their planters to
account for smaller seed. The crop season was beset with a
wet period and a dry period but the seed germinated well;
however, in several areas the seeds were planted too closely,
causing low yields from crowding. The plaintiffs sued for
breach of warranty and negligence. The jury awarded the
plaintiffs the value of the loss of production, the value of the
milo lost as feed and punitive damages. The court held that
the awards for loss of production and for the value of the
lost production as feed were a double recovery and reversed
the award for the milo as feed. The court also reversed the
punitive damages award, holding that the plaintiffs failed to
show willful or wanton misconduct by the defendant in
packing smaller seed. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Murphree, 653
So.2d 857 (Miss. 1994).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The taxpayer corporation
owned forest land on the Gulf of Mexico. The land was
subject to a zoning ordinance that restricted the land use to
silviculture. The taxpayer did not use the land for
silviculture but merely held the land for investment. The
court held that the denial of assessment as agricultural land
was proper because the taxpayer attempted no agricultural
production on the land. The concurring opinion noted that
although the land could not be assessed as agricultural land,
the valuation of the land should have taken into account the
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zoning use restriction. Davis v. St. Joe Paper Co., 652






AGRICULTURAL USE. A company applied for
permission to operate a composting facility on its land
zoned for agricultural use under the local ordinance. The
facility would use various organic materials shipped in
from third parties, including trees, yard refuse, treated
human waste, food processing waste and chicken manure.
The materials would be composted in buildings set on
concrete slabs and then shipped to various users for use as
fertilizer and soil conditioners. The zoning board approved
the request, ruling that the facility was sufficiently similar
to a sawmill or natural resource uses identified in the
ordinance as permitted uses. The zoning ordinance defined
permitted agricultural uses as the raising of farm products,
including livestock, poultry and crops. The court held that
the compost facility was not an agricultural operation
because the facility did not use products raised on the land
and did not use the products on the land owned by the
facility. The court also held that the zoning board's ruling
that the facility was similar to a sawmill or natural resource
use was reversed because the zoning board cited no
evidence to support the board's ruling. Clout, Inc. v.
Clinton Zoning Bd., 657 A.2d 111 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer only for Digest subscribers, the
Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115, including at
no extra charge updates published within five months
after purchase. Updates are published every four months
to keep the Manual current with the latest developments.
After the first free update, additional updates will be billed
at $100 per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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